Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary
Volume 24

Issue 2

Article 8

10-15-2004

Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: The Supreme
Court's Clarification of Whether Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Laws Violate Convicted Sex Offenders' Right to
Procedural Due Process
Gabriel Baldwin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourteenth
Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Gabriel Baldwin, Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: The Supreme Court's Clarification of
Whether Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Violate Convicted Sex Offenders' Right to
Procedural Due Process, 24 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges. (2004)
available at https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol24/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Connecticut Departmentof Public Safety v. Doe: The
Supreme Court's Clarification of Whether Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Laws Violate
Convicted Sex Offenders' Right to Procedural Due
Process
Gabriel Baldwin*

I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
While sex offender registration and notification laws have been
the subject of both criticism and praise since their widespread
enactment in the 1990's, the issue of whether they violate convicted
sex offenders' rights to procedural due process appears to have been
clarified in the Supreme Court case Connecticut Department of
Public Safety v. Doe.' To arrive at this apparent clarification, the
Court first had to struggle to define and limit the contours and
boundaries of what determines whether reputation interests are
constitutionally protected.

* I would like to thank Lea Keal and the rest of the Journal of the N.A.A.L.J.
staff for supporting me and providing me with the opportunity to write this article.
I would also like to thank my family, friends, Jocelyn Kuklok, and my feline
companion Einstein for their love and encouragement. Finally, I would like to
thank the authors who came before me and wrote pieces which analyzed this U.S.
Supreme Court case. Their works were helpful in researching and writing this case
note. These authors and their respective works are as follows: Kimberly B.
Wilkins, Sex Offender Registrationand Community Notification Laws: Will These
Laws Survive?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1245, 1246-50 (2003); Jennifer G. Daugherty,
Sex Offender Registration Laws and Procedural Due Process: Why Doe v.
Department of Public Safety Ex Rel. Lee Should be Overturned, 26 HAMLINE L.
REV. 713, 739-43 (2003).
1. See Doe v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 41-42 nn.4-5 (2d Cir.
2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Kimberly B. Wilkins, Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification Laws: Will These Laws Survive?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV.
1245, 1246-50 (2003).
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In a series of three cases, the Court established and elaborated
upon the extent to which reputation interests are liberty interests
2
protected by Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process.
During this period, the Court initially appeared to provide a great
deal of protection for reputation interests when it issued a broad
pronouncement in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.3 Constantineau held
that due process protection would be available for reputation interests
where the government attaches a "badge of infamy.",4 In addition,
the Court held that notice and an opportunity to be heard would be
required "where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity
5
is [put] at stake because of' government action.
In Paul v. Davis and Siegert v. Gilley, the Court subsequently
limited Constantineau's holding by introducing additional
requirements which determine when reputation interests are
considered Fourteenth Amendment protected liberty interests. 6 Paul
v. Davis provided that in order for a reputation interest to be
considered a liberty interest, a claimant must show not just damage to
reputation by state stigmatization, but also that some tangible
interest, such as a state legal status or right, was affected by the
7
stigmatization.
In Siegert v. Gilley, the Court further required that in order for
reputation interests to be a protected liberty interest, a claimant must
show some "special damage and out-of-pocket loss" was caused by
the effect of the state's stigmatization upon some tangible interest,
such as a state legal status or right.8 Siegert also provides that if this
connection cannot be shown, the state will be considered to be only
minimally involved, and no constitutional protection is required
because a remedy can still be pursued in a defamation action "under
the laws of most States." 9

2. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1991).
3. Constantineau,400 U.S. at 437.
4.Id.
5. Id.

6.Davis, 424 U.S. at 699-7 13, 721; Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233-34.
7. Davis, 424 U.S. at 699-713, 721.
8. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233-34.
9. Id.
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In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe ("Connecticut

Department"), the Court appears to have further clarified the
boundaries of what determines whether a reputation interest is
constitutionally protected.' 0 In Connecticut Department, the Court
considered whether convicted sex offenders' reputation interests are
liberty interests which receive due process protection when said
offenders are submitted to the requirements of sex offender
registration and notification laws, i.e. governmental action which
seemingly stigmatizes them.'" After refusing to conduct a postSiegert, Paul v. Davis test, an inquiry which normally is used to
determine whether there is a protected liberty interest, the Court held
that in order to receive a hearing, a claimant must show that the fact
he seeks to establish at the requested hearing is relevant and or
material to the regulatory scheme or inquiry at issue.12
This note analyzes Connecticut Department and prior Supreme
Court decisions which define and limit the contours and boundaries
of what determines whether a reputation interest is constitutionally
protected. Following a review of Connecticut Department's facts,
the note provides a brief overview of relevant preceding Supreme
Court cases. The note next examines this recent decision by
analyzing each of its three opinions. It then discusses the legal and
social impact of this decision with respect to administrative agencies
and society in general. Finally, the note ends with the conclusion that
although the judgment of the Court has apparently clarified whether
sex offender registry laws are constitutional as to procedural due
process, it leaves open the possibility of a successful equal protection
substantive due process attack in the future.
H. CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT'S FACTS AND CASES PRECEDING
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY V. DOE

A. Connecticut Department's Facts
In order to protect against the serious threat that sex offenders
pose to juveniles and society as a whole, Connecticut, along with

10. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 1-8 (2003).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 6-8.
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other states, enacted sex offender registration and notification laws
popularly known as "Megan's Laws."' 13 Connecticut's statute
"applies to all persons convicted of criminal offenses against a minor,
violent and nonviolent sexual offenses, and felonies committed for a
sexual purpose."' 14 The statute requires all such persons to register
with Connecticut's Department of Public Safety (the Department)
upon release.' 5 In most cases, the registration requirement runs for
ten years, but in the case of sexually violent offenses, offenders must
register for life. 16 The statute requires each registered offender to
provide personal information including his or her name, address,
photograph, fingerprints, criminal history record, a list of other
identifying characteristics, and a DNA sample. 17 The statute also
mandates that registered offenders notify the Department of any

13. See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 1246-47. A federal law, the Jacob Wetterling
Act, mandates that states enact such laws or become ineligible for ten percent of a
formula grant that they would otherwise receive under a state and local law
enforcement assistance program. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000)).
14. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 4. "'Criminal offense[s] against a victim who is a
minor' are defined ... to include kidnapping, unlawful restraint, and a wide variety

of sexual acts against persons under the age of eighteen made criminal by various
other specified Connecticut statutes." Doe, 271 F.3d at 42 n.6 (citing CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-250(2) (2001)). "Nonviolent sexual offense[s]" are defined in such a
way as to render "a wide variety of sexual acts Class A misdemeanors." Id. n.7
(citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-250(5); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a). "Sexually
violent offenses" are defined so as to include certain levels of sexual assault, and
also kidnappings that the court finds were "committed with intent to sexually
violate or abuse the victim." Id. n.8 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-250(11)). The
sentencing court determines whether a felony was committed for a sexual purpose.
Id. n.9 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-254(a)). Upon such a finding, the
sentencing court may require the offender to register as a sexual offender. Id.
15. Doe, 271 F.3d at 43 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-251(a) (2001)). "Two
narrow categories of offenders" are eligible for relief from the statute's provisions
and "need not register ...

if a court so orders upon finding that registration is not

required for public safety." Id. at 45 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54- 251(b), (c)).
The first category is "anyone who was convicted of engaging, while under nineteen
years of age, in sexual intercourse with a victim who was between thirteen and
sixteen years old but at least two years younger than the perpetrator." Id. The
second category is "anyone who was convicted of subjecting another person to
sexual contact without the victim's consent." Id.
16. Id. at 43 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-252(a)).
17. Id.; Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at4.
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change in residence and periodically submit an updated photograph. 18
Respondent, a Connecticut resident, had been convicted of an
offense based on conduct that took place prior to the law's effective
date. 19 The conviction for this offense subjects Respondent to the
20
registration and notification requirements of Connecticut's statute.
Respondent claimed that the disclosures made and required pursuant
to the statute deprived him and other similarly situated registered sex
offenders of a "liberty interest," and violated the Due Process Clause
because officials did not afford registrants a pre-deprivation hearing
21
to determine whether they are likely to be "currently dangerous".

18. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 4. "The law also covers any Connecticut resident
who has been convicted in another jurisdiction of a crime 'the essential elements of
which are substantially the same as any of the crimes' within the statutory
categories." Doe, 271 F.3d at 42-43 n.10 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-253(a)).
"The law also imposes a reciprocal obligation on anyone who is registered and
lives in another state but regularly travels into or temporarily resides in
Connecticut." Id. at 43 n.12 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-253(b)). "In addition,
a person convicted of a felony committed for a sexual purpose can also be required
to register for ten years at the discretion of the sentencing court." Id. at 43 (citing
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-254(a)).
Groups of offenders within two additional categories must also
register for life: (i; anyone who has committed a criminal offense
against a minor or a nonviolent sexual offense and has a prior
conviction of the same type, and (ii) anyone convicted of the crime
of sexual assault in the second degree for engaging in sexual
intercourse with a victim who is under thirteen years old and more
than two years younger than the perpetrator.
Id. at 43 n.l 1 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-251(a)). "A person convicted of a
sexually violent offense also must provide 'documentation of any treatment
received for mental abnormality or personality disorder,' . . . and must verify his or
her address once every ninety days." Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-252(a),
54-257(c)). "Failure to comply with any of these duties constitutes a class D
felony, punishable by up to five years in prison." Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
54-251(d), 54-252(d), 54-253(c), 54-254(b)).
19. Id. at 45.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 45-46. Respondent also introduced an ex post facto claim which the
district court dismissed on the ground that Respondent had "failed, as a matter of
law, to demonstrate that the registration law was punitive either in purpose or in
effect and therefore granted judgment to the defendants." Id. at 46 (citing Doe v.
Lee, 132 F. Supp. 2d 57, 66-71 (D. Conn. 2001)). On the same day this case was
decided, Smith v. Doe, a case featuring an ex post facto challenge to Alaska's Sex
Offender Registration Act, was decided. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). The
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Connecticut's statute requires the Department to compile the
information gathered from registrants and to publicize it via an
offender registry on an Internet website which is made available to
the public in certain state offices. 22 The registry is also made
available in non-internet form in state offices. 23 The registry,
whether accessed via the Internet or at a state office, must be
accompanied by a warning which states "'[a]ny person who uses
information in this registry to injure, harass or commit a criminal act
against any person included in the registry or any other person is
subject to criminal prosecution. '24
Before it was taken offline
pursuant to the trial court injunction, the registry website allowed
individuals "to obtain the name, address, photograph, and description
of any registered sex offender by entering a zip code or town
name." 25 The registry, on its website and in non-internet form,
features a statement that explicitly indicates that the registry is
"'based on the legislature's decision to facilitate access to publiclyavailable information about persons convicted of sexual offenses."' 26
It also explicitly states that the state or its officials have "'not
considered or assessed the specific risk of reoffense with regard to
any individual prior to his or her inclusion within this registry, and
has made no determination that any individual included in the
registry is currently dangerous."' 27 The registry also states that
"'[i]ndividuals included within the registry are included solely by
virtue of their conviction record and state law.' '"28 In addition, the
registry contains a statement indicating that "'[t]he main purpose of
providing this data on the Internet is to make the information more
easily available and accessible, not to warn about any specific
individual. "29

Court in Smith held that the retroactive application of the Alaskan statute was nonpunitive and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 105-06.
22. Doe, 271 F.3d at 43-44.
23. Id. at 44.
24. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-258(a)).
25. Conn. Dep't,538 U.S. at 5.
26. Id. (quoting Doe, 271 F.3d at 44).
27. Id. (quoting Doe, 271 F.3d at 44).
28. Id. (quoting Doe, 271 F.3d at 44).
29. Id. (quoting Doe, 271 F.3d at 44).
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Certiorari was granted to determine whether disclosures made
pursuant to Connecticut's sex offender registration and notification
statute both deprived registered sex offenders of a "liberty interest,"
and violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford
registrants a pre-deprivation hearing to determine whether they are
likely to be "currently dangerous." 30 Based upon statements
contained in the registry, the Supreme Court's majority concluded
that Connecticut decided to base its registry requirement on the fact
of previous conviction, not the fact of current dangerousness. 3' The
Court, with seven Justices joining in a majority opinion and three
other Justices writing concurring opinions, held that no protected
liberty interest existed. The majority opinion further held that even
assuming arguendo that such an interest existed, a hearing was not
required by the Constitution because due process does not require the
opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory
32
scheme- in this case, whether a sex offender is currently dangerous.
B. Defining What Determines Whether Reputation Interests are
ConstitutionallyProtected: Cases Priorto Connecticut Department
of Public Safety v. Doe
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the Court began to establish to
what extent reputation interests are liberty interests protected by
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process. 33 In Constantineau,
an individual who the state had labeled as an excessive drinker
challenged a Wisconsin statute which allowed liquor stores to refuse
to sell alcohol to individuals whom the state had labeled as excessive
drinkers and who had been listed on a state published excessive

30. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 4-5. After hearing Respondent's due process
claim made on behalf of himself and other similarly situated sex offenders, the
District Court granted summary judgment for Respondent, certified a class of
individuals subject to the Connecticut law and permanently enjoined the law's
public disclosure provisions. Id. at 2. The Court of Appeals affirmed holding that
the Due Process Clause entitles class members to a hearing "to determine whether
or not they are particularly likely to be currently dangerous before being labeled as
such by their inclusion in a publicly disseminated registry." Id. at 4.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Constantineau,400 U.S. 433.
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drinkers list.3 4 Constantineau challenged the statute on the ground
that it violated due process because it labeled him and others
similarly situated as excessive drinkers without first affording notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 35 The Court deemed the statute
unconstitutional and held that there would be due process protection
for reputation interests where the government attaches a "badge of
infamy," and that notice and an opportunity to be heard would be
required "where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity
is at stake because of what the government is doing. 3 6
The Court subsequently limited Constantineau'sbroad holding in
Paul v. Davis.37 In Davis, an individual challenged the police
practice of distributing flyers to local businesses that identified him
and others, by use of their name and picture, as suspected
shoplifters.3 8 The challenge was based on the grounds that the
practice deprived the identified individuals of a liberty interest by
adversely affecting their reputation, or attaching "a badge of infamy"
to them as shoplifters, without first affording them due process in the
form of notice and an opportunity to be heard.3 9 The Court declared
the practice to be constitutional and held that damage to reputation
caused by a defamatory statement or stigmatization alone would not
implicate a due process liberty or property interest. 40 The Court
further held that to maintain a due process claim, one must show that
some tangible interest, such as a state legal status or right, was
affected by the damage to reputation caused by a defamatory
statement or stigmatization. 4' In the wake of Paul v. Davis, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal interpreted Davis' holding and
thereby developed what is known as the stigma plus test. 42 Under the
first prong of this test, a claimant must show that the statement at
issue is capable of being proven false, that it is sufficiently

34. Id. at 434.
35. Id. at 433-34.
36. Id. at 437.
37. Davis, 424 U.S. at 699-713.

38. Id. at 694-97.
39. Id. at 697.
40. Id. at 699-702.
41. Id. at 708-09.
42. See Doe, 271 F.3d at 47.
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derogatory to injure their reputation and that the claimant maintains
that said statement is false.4 3 Under the second prong, a claimant
must show that the stigmatization established in the first prong
affected some tangible interest, imposed a 44material, state-imposed
burden, or altered claimant's status or rights.
In Siegert v. Gilley, the Court added another requirement that
claimants must meet in order for reputation interests to be considered
protected liberty interests. 45 Siegert, a former government employee
who had resigned from his position, claimed that he was denied due
process of a protected liberty interest when his former supervisor
issued an allegedly bad faith and defamatory report regarding his job
performance.4 6 Siegert claimed that this report left him unable to
47
The Court
obtain appropriate future employment in his field.
deemed the reputation interest at issue to be one that does not rise to
the level of being constitutionally protected.4 8 The Court held that in
order for a reputation interest to receive constitutional protection, a
claimant must show that some "special damage and out-of-pocket
loss" was caused by the effect of the state's stigmatization upon some
49
If this
tangible interest, such as a state legal status or right.
connection could not be shown, then the state would be considered to
be only minimally involved, and no constitutional protection would
be required. 50 The Court reasoned that where the state is only
minimally involved, there is no need for constitutional protection
because such damage would be "actionable under the laws of most
51
states" under a state defamation cause of action.

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Siegert, 500 U.S. 226.

46. Id. at 226.

47. Id. at 229.
48. Id. at 233-34.
49. Id. at 234.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 233.
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II. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS

A. The Majority Opinion of the Court Deliveredby Justice Rehnquist
In one of three opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the
opinion of the Court, in which he was joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.52 Chief
Justice Rehnquist began by citing statements on the registry's
website and in its non-internet form as supporting the conclusion that
Connecticut's registry law is based on "the fact of previous
conviction, not the fact of current dangerousness. 53 The Justice also
emphasized that "the public registry explicitly states that officials
have not determined that any registrant is currently dangerous. 54
After briefly commenting on the policy considerations, recidivist
concerns and needs which led to the passage of Connecticut's statute
and other sex offender registration and notification statutes, Chief
Justice Rehnquist described the specific provisions of the
Connecticut statute.55
After refusing to conduct a post-Siegert, Paul v. Davis inquiry in
order to determine whether Respondent had a protected liberty
interest, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "even assuming,
arguendo, that Respondent has been deprived of a liberty interest,
due process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact that is
not material under the Connecticut statute" - here, whether the
respondent is currently dangerous. 56 The Chief Justice then
distinguished cases such as Wisconsin v. Constantineau and Goss v.
Lopez by emphasizing that in those cases the fact in question was
"concededly relevant to the inquiry at hand" while in this case
"the
fact that Respondent seeks to prove - that he is not currently
dangerous - is of no consequence .... ,57 The Chief Justice reasoned

that the fact of current dangerousness was of no consequence, and no

52. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 3-8.
53. Id.at4.
54. Id.

55.Id.
56. Id.at7.

57. Id.(citing Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975)).
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hearing was required because the requirements of the law at issue
"turn on an offender's conviction alone - a fact that a convicted
offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to
contest. ' 58 The Chief Justice further supported his position by citing
a statement on the agency's website which essentially states that an
59
offender's alleged non-dangerousness simply does not matter. The
Chief Justice continued to support his view by stating that all
evidence on record indicated that Connecticut decided to require
registration of all sex60 offenders regardless of whether or not they are
currently dangerous.
The Chief Justice then stated that the only plausible successful
challenge Respondent could have brought was a substantive due
process theory, but that Respondent only presented a substantive
claim "recast in 'procedural due process' terms." 61 The Chief Justice
further added that even if a substantive due process claim had been
presented, the Court could not address it because Respondent
expressly disavowed any reliance on substantive Fourteenth
Amendment protections. 62 The Chief Justice further added that
neither a substantive due process nor Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection argument was properly presented to the court. 63 The Chief
Justice concluded by holding that Doe's procedural due process
rights were not violated because those "who assert a right to a
hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they
seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the statutory
scheme." 64 The Chief Justice further held that, in this case, the fact
dangerous was not relevant to
of whether Respondent was currently
65
scheme.
the registry's statutory
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion concisely phrases what was
an unstated logical due process requirement as a rigid requirement,
which must be explicitly met before a hearing is constitutionally

58. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 7.
59. Id.
60. Id.

61. Id. at 7-8 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 308 (1993)).
62. Id. at 8.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.

394

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

24-2

required.66 However, in reaching the holding in this case the Chief
Justice may have faltered by glossing over the wording of the
statute's provisions which allows for judges to discretionarily exempt
offenders from the statute's registration, reporting, and other
affirmative requirements. Based upon this less than complete review
of the statute, the opinion then perhaps concludes too quickly that an
offender's current dangerousness is irrelevant or immaterial to
Connecticut's statutory scheme and that the statute instead turns only
upon the fact of the offender's conviction.
Justice Souter's concurring opinion discussed these provisions,
which allow judges to grant exemptions to offenders meeting certain
criteria. 67 Individuals who qualify for this discretionary relief include
cases where the offense was unconsented sexual contact or sexual
intercourse between a minor between thirteen and sixteen years old
and an offender under nineteen years old but more than two years
older than the minor at the time of the offense.68 Another such
provision allows dissemination of registration information to be
limited when it is necessary to protect a victim that is related to, the
spouse of, or cohabiting with the offender. 69 As Justice Souter
pointed out in his concurrence, the statute provides that these judicial
decisions to exempt offenders "must rest on a finding that registration
or public dissemination is not required for public safety.",70
These provisions arguably illustrate that the legislature
envisioned creating a statutory scheme that simultaneously provided
for public safety by tracking and monitoring all offenders while
allowing judges to exempt non-dangerous offenders from the
statute's requirements. 7 1 In addition, these judicial exemption
provisions demonstrate that if a court were required to hold a hearing
to determine whether an offender is currently dangerous, then it
would be capable of doing so. 72
While sound for the most part, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion

66. Id.
67. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 8.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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could have been made more intellectually defensible if these
provisions had been briefly discussed and reconciled with the Court's
holding. This reconciliation could have been accomplished by
characterizing the issue of current dangerousness as only being
relevant or material when the offense at issue falls within one of the
statute's enumerated exemption provisions. By characterizing these
provisions in this way, the majority could have acknowledged that
current dangerousness is relevant to the statute in some cases while
showing that it was not relevant to this case. This would have
resulted in a more complete, thorough, and intellectually sound
opinion.
B. The Concurrences
1. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
In joining the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that even
if the statute implicated a liberty interest, "the categorical abrogation
of that liberty interest by a validly enacted statute suffice[d] to
provide all the process that is 'due."' 73 The Justice supported this
view by analogizing the Connecticut registry statute to "a state law
providing that no one under the age of 16 may operate a motor
vehicle.",74 He used this analogy to further support the Court's
holding by stating "a convicted sex offender has no more right to
additional 'process' enabling him to establish that he is not dangerous
right to 'process' enabling him to
than . . . a 15-year-old has a 75
driver.,
safe
a
is
establish that he
While Justice Scalia's analogy provides an easily accessible
illustration for his reasoning and the majority's holding, it may also
oversimplify the issue of whether the fact of current dangerousness is
relevant to this statute.76 Justice Scalia's concurrence, like the
majority opinion, fails to consider and fully address the statute's
judicial exemption provisions. 77 As discussed above with respect to

73. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 8.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.

396

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

24-2

the majority opinion, Justice Scalia's concurrence would have
benefited from a discussion that first acknowledged that current
dangerousness would be relevant if the respondent's case fell within
one of the statute's exemption provisions and then secondly
emphasized that such an exemption does not apply to the
respondent's case. 78 If Justice Scalia's concurrence added such a
discussion, then his simple and direct opinion and it's analogy would
be more logical, well-reasoned, and convincing.
2. Justice Souter's Concurrence in which Justice Ginsburg Joined
Justice Souter began by agreeing with the majority that this case's
holding would not foreclose a future substantive due process
challenge. 79 The Justice then stated that if libel were a component of
such a claim, it would not stand in the way of such a challenge. 80
The Justice then alluded to the possibility of a future equal protection
attack by stating that another challenge, apart from the substantive
due process claim discussed by the other opinions, could be
brought. 8 1 The Justice supported this view by briefly examining the
provisions of the statute, which allow judges to exempt offenders
meeting certain criteria from the statute's registration, reporting, and
other affirmative requirements.8 2 Justice Souter continued by
explaining that the statute provided that judicial decisions to exempt
offenders "must rest on a finding that registration or public
dissemination is not required for public safety.- 83 The Justice
concluded that these provisions illustrate that "[t]he State thus
recognizes that some offenders within the sweep of the [statute's]
publication requirement are not dangerous to others . . . and the
legislative decision to make courts responsible for granting
exemptions belies the . . . argument that courts are unequipped to

78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 9.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 9-10. In a footnote Justice Souter also commented on similar
provisions, which ease the retroactive effect of the statute by allowing courts to
discretionarily restrict dissemination of the registry's information. Id at 10 n.*.
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separate offenders who warrant

. . .

publication from those who do

not." 84

Based upon this examination of these provisions, Justice
Souter then explicitly left open the possibility of a future equal
protection attack on the statute and others like it.85 The Justice
accomplished this by discussing how the statute's judicial exemption
provisions affect individual rights by drawing a line between
offenders who are considered eligible to seek discretionary relief
from the courts and those who are not. 86 However, the Justice
qualified his opinion by explicitly stating that he was merely noting
that the Court's rejection of Respondent's procedural due process
schemes like Connecticut's from
claim did not "immunize publication
87
an equal protection challenge."
Justice Souter's concurrence clarified, elaborated, and reaffirmed
the possibility of a future substantive due process or equal protection
challenge that was only briefly mentioned in the majority opinion. In
addition, the concurrence implicitly indicated that current
dangerousness was relevant in cases where the statute's exemptions
apply but was not relevant in the case at issue because Respondent
did not fall within any of the statute's exemptions. Justice Souter
implied this by discussing the exemption provisions of the statute and
how a judge's grant of an exemption must be based upon a finding
that an offender's compliance with the statute is not required for
public safety. 88 However, this opinion could have been clearer if
Justice Souter made this point more explicitly.
3. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in a combined opinion
that examined this case and another sex offender register and
notification statute case, Smith v. Doe. 89 Justice Stevens started by
asserting that the proper analysis of both cases should begin by

84. Id. at 10.
85. See Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 9-10.

86. Id. at 9.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 9-10.
89. Smith, 538 U.S. at 109-10.
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determining whether a liberty interest was implicated. 90 In making
this determination, the Justice stated that the statute's impact upon
the registrants' freedom should be considered. 91 The Justice then
described the specific provisions of the statutes in both cases and
commented that in both cases they "impose significant affirmative
obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they
apply.",92 The Justice then described the obligations under the statute
as being "comparable to the duties imposed on other convicted
criminals during periods of supervised release or parole." 93 Justice
Stevens continued by asserting that widespread public access to the
personal information required by the statutes has a severe
stigmatizing effect. 94 Justice Stevens then supported this assertion by
citing a brief which stated that after their registration information was
made widely available offenders experienced threats, assaults, loss of
housing, and loss of jobs. 95 Justice Stevens proceeded to discuss the
96
ex post facto issues addressed in Smith v. Doe.
Although Stevens dissented with respect to the court's ex post
facto holding in Smith v. Doe, the Justice concluded his opinion by
strongly concurring with the Court's holding in Connecticut
Department.97 The justice stated that for those convicted after the
statutes effective date, "there would be no separate procedural due
process violation so long as a defendant is provided a constitutionally
98
adequate trial."
Steven's concurrence is a well written and logical opinion in
which he grudgingly supports the majority's holding and thereby
enables it to be used as relatively stable procedural due process
precedent in future cases. 99 Stevens' conclusion could be read by
some as implicitly concluding that no stigmatization results from

90. Id. at 110.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Smith, 538 U.S. at 110-11.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 110-12.
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having to comply with the statute's registration and reporting
requirements. However, the Justice's discussion of the stigmatizing
effect of the statute's registration and reporting requirements,
described supra, makes the accuracy of this reading unlikely. 00 In
light of this discussion, it appears the Justice may have erred in his
opinion by stopping short of fully and thoroughly addressing the
issue of whether the registration requirements in fact have a
stigmatizing effect.
While it is clear that the disclosure that occurs with the
dissemination of the registry's information sheds a negative light
upon registered offenders, what is unclear is whether the information
disclosed is false or defamatory and therefore stigmatizes registered
offenders. 10 1 According to either Paul v. Davis or the Second
Circuit's formulation of the Davis' holding, a claimant must show
that the statement at issue is false and derogatory before it can be
deemed stigmatizing.' 02 The information being disclosed pursuant to
Connecticut's statute, like an offender's conviction along with other
objective facts such as their residence and other personal information,
is true and non-defamatory. 10 3 In addition, the bad light shed or de
facto stigmatization which occurs in the wake of this information
being disclosed arguably stems from the true fact that the offenders
subject to the statute have been convicted of heinous crimes which
much of society looks upon with great disdain.' 0 4 If one follows this
analysis to its end, it indicates that perhaps no stigmatization was
present in this case and therefore there was likely no reputation
liberty interest implicated. Consequently, Justice Stevens may have
been able to make his opinion more complete and convincing if a line
of reasoning such as this had been explicitly featured. In addition,
the majority opinion could have more clearly addressed whether a

100. Id. at 110.
101. For a more in depth discussion of whether the dissemination of
information in this case stigmatized Respondent See Jennifer G. Daugherty, Sex
Offender RegistrationLaws and ProceduralDue Process: Why Doe v. Department
of Public Safety Ex Rel. Lee Should be Overturned, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 713, 73943 (2003).
102. Davis, 424 U.S. at 699-702, 708-09 (1976); Doe, 271 F.3d 38, 47 (2001).
103. Doe, 271 F.3d at 43; see also Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 7; Daugherty,
supra note 101, at 739-43.
104. See Daugherty, supra note 101, at 744-45.
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liberty interest was present in this case by featuring such a passage.
IV. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Legal and Social Impact of the Court's Decision
The Court's decision in Connecticut Department of Public Safety
v. Doe indicates that future procedural due process challenges to sex
offender registry statutes that turn on an offender's conviction alone
will be unsuccessful. 10 5 However, this statement must be qualified
by the fact that neither a substantive due process nor an equal
protection challenge was heard in this case. 10 6 It also must be
qualified by the fact that the majority opinion and a concurring
opinion acknowledged, either implicitly or explicitly, that if such a
07
challenge was brought it may succeed. 1
Further, the Court's failure to resolve whether dissemination of
registry information stigmatizes registered offenders creates
uncertainty in future cases which address the constitutionality of
statutory schemes that consider current dangerousness or other
considerations to be relevant, i.e., statues that do not turn on the fact
of conviction alone. However, in light of the criticism of Stevens'
concurrence, supra, it is arguable that if the Court were confronted
with such a case, it would likely find that the conviction itself is
truthful and therefore dissemination of registry information cannot
stigmatize registered offenders. 10 8 In addition, such a court would
also likely find that any de facto stigmatization or bad light shed on
registered offenders is attributable to the fact that they have been
convicted of a heinous crime which much of society looks upon with
09
great disdain. 1
In turn, what this decision means for supporters of sex offender

105. See Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 6-7 (2003). In addition, Smith v. Doe has
held that retroactive application of a similar Alaskan statute was not punitive and
therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Smith, 538
U.S. at 105.
106. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 6.
107. Id. at 6-8.
108. Smith, 538 U.S. at 111-12; Daugherty, supra note 101, at 739-43.
109. Daugherty, supra note 101, at 739-43.
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registration and notification statutes is that statutes which resemble
Connecticut's will be immune to procedural due process attacks.
Further, this case could also be interpreted to mean that statutes that
differ from Connecticut's, e.g. ones that do not turn only upon the
fact of conviction, will also likely be found not to violate procedural
due process. On the other hand, those in the opposition should keep
in mind that the court's holding is a narrow one that only explicitly
applies to statutes resembling Connecticut's and that it only
110
addresses whether such statutes violate procedural due process.
Those opposing registration and notification statutes such as this one
should also take heart in the fact that the majority and concurring
opinions acknowledge the possibility of a future successful equal
protection or substantive due process attack. "'
B. The Decision'sImpact upon Federal,State, and Local
Administrative Agencies
1. Impact upon Agencies Implementing Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Statutes
In the wake of this decision state agencies and officials who
implement sex offender registration and notification statutes like
Connecticut's can take comfort in knowing that they can, for now,
continue to implement and enforce their statute without being
vulnerable to a successful procedural due process attack."l 2 Agencies
and officials who implement sex offender registrations which
consider current dangerousness or other considerations to be relevant,
i.e., statues that do not turn on the fact of conviction alone, can also
take comfort in this decision. This comfort would be justified in light
of the discussion above regarding how no liberty interest would be at
issue because dissemination of objective and truthful registry
information would likely be found to not truly stigmatize registered
offenders. However, this comfort should be tempered by the fact that

110. Conn. Dep't, 538 U.S. at 6 (citing Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433; Goss,
419 U.S. 565; 538 U.S. at 7).
111. Daugherty, supra note 101, at 744-45.
112. In addition, statutes like Connecticut's may not be subject to an Ex Post
Facto Clause attack in light of the holding in Smith v. Doe. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105.
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this opinion leaves these agencies and officials vulnerable to possible
3
successful substantive due process or equal protection challenges."
In order to eliminate some of this uncertainty, state legislatures
could ward off possible equal protection clause attacks by
eliminating exemption provisions, which resemble the judicial
exemption provisions in Connecticut's statute. By doing so the
legislature would perhaps eliminate any legislative lines drawn
between offenders, which could serve as possible grounds for an
equal protection attack. However, if this action was taken to protect
its statute, a legislature may end up compromising the policy balance
it originally accomplished by requiring registration and notification
of all sex offenders and then allowing judges to discretionarily
exempt offenders whom fall within legislatively created categories.
In the end it appears that state agencies, officials, and legislatures
must again wait for the Court to speak, only this time they will wait
to hear whether these statutes violate substantive due process or the
equal protection clause.
2.

The Decision's Impact outside of the Sex Offender Registry
Context

Although this case features a compelling and controversial
subject, Connecticut Department's holding may also be applicable
outside of the sex offender registry context. For one, its holding
could be used to confirm the due process constitutionality of other
criminal registry systems which turn upon the fact of conviction of a
crime other than those covered by statues such as Connecticut's
statute. Some of the offenses that could potentially be addressed by
such legislation are violent crimes or controlled substance associated
offenses. However, one should keep in mind that while this holding
appears to be universally applicable with respect to due process,
these hypothetical criminal registry laws, like Connecticut's statute,
could still be subject to constitutional attacks on substantive due
process or equal protection grounds.
Secondly, this holding could also be used to confirm the
constitutionality of schemes that subject individuals and entities to
registration based upon the fact that they have been found guilty of a

113. Id.
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particular civil or regulatory offense after being afforded due process
in the form of a civil or administrative proceeding. In other words,
this holding could be relied upon by legislatures and rule-making
agencies when designing regulatory schemes which subject entities
and individuals to affirmative duties and obligations on the basis that
they have been convicted of violations of regulations or statutes.
Thus, remarkably, this holding could conceivably be applied to noncriminal violations of regulations and statutes, which address subjects
ranging from environmental regulation to securities regulation. In
the end it appears that the simple and before unstated constitutional
requirement embodied in Connecticut Department'sholding could be
used in many different legal contexts for years to come.
V. CONCLUSION

Although the judgment of the Court clarified the constitutionality
of sex offender registry laws as to procedural due process, it clearly
leaves open the possibility of successful equal protection or
substantive due process attacks in the future. Since the offender in
this case relied solely upon a procedural due process theory and
presented no substantive due process or equal protection argument,
the Court was left without the opportunity to fully address whether
these statutes are constitutional in every respect. As a result, the
Court was left with little choice but to issue its narrow holding in this
case and consequently agencies, officials, legislatures, and others are
left waiting for the Court to speak as to whether these statutes violate
substantive due process or the equal protection clause.

